_________________________________________________________________

  E M P L O Y E E   B E N E F I T S ,   C O M P E N S A T I O N
                  A N D   P E N S I O N   L A W
                Vol. 3,  No. 3: February 14, 2002
_________________________________________________________________

Publisher:     LSN Subject Matter Journals
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Editor:        PAMELA J. PERUN
               Urban Institute
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Copyright:     SSEP, Inc. 2002. All rights reserved.

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                      Topic of This Issue:
                      The Costs of Health
   ___________________________________________________________


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T A B L E   of   C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________


NEW and FORTHCOMING ARTICLES

"First, Do No Harm: Designing Tax Incentives for Health
 Insurance"
      National Tax Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 473-493,
      September 2001
     LEONARD E. BURMAN
        Urban Institute
     AMELIA GRUBER
        Northwestern University


"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
 Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2001 Current Population Survey"
      EBRI Issue Brief, No. 240, December 2001
     PAUL FRONSTIN
        Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)


"Financing Long-Term Care in the United States: Who Should Pay
 for Mom and Dad?"
      AGING: CARING FOR OUR ELDERS, David N. Weisstub, David C.
      Thomasma, Serge Gauthier & George F. Tomossy, eds., Kluwer
      Academic Publishers
     RICHARD L. KAPLAN
        University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College
        of Law


"Retiree Health Benefits: Trends and Outlook"
      EBRI Issue Brief, No. 236, August 2001
     PAUL FRONSTIN
        Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)

WORKING PAPERS

"Taxes and Health Insurance"
     JONATHAN GRUBER
        Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
        Department of Economics
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


"Learning and the Value of Information: The Case of Health Plan
 Report Cards"
     MICHAEL CHERNEW
        University of Michigan
        Department of Economics
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
     GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN
        University of Minnesota
        Department of Economics
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
     DENNIS P. SCANLON
        Pennsylvania State University


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EDITORIAL POLICIES
 To provide the broadest coverage of research in Employee
 Benefits, Compensation and Pension Law we do not referee working
 papers. We accept abstracts of working papers in Employee
 Benefits, Compensation and Pension Law whose topics suit the
 coverage of the journal and which are part of the worldwide
 scholarly discourse.


N E W   and   F O R T H C O M I N G   Articles
_________________________________________________________________

"First, Do No Harm: Designing Tax Incentives for Health
 Insurance"
      National Tax Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 473-493,
      September 2001

      BY:  LEONARD E. BURMAN
              Urban Institute
           AMELIA GRUBER
              Northwestern University

 Contact:  LEONARD E. BURMAN
   Email:  Mailto:lburman@ui.urban.org
  Postal:  Urban Institute
           2100 M Street, NW
           Washington, DC 20037  USA
   Phone:  202-261-5248
 Co-Auth:  AMELIA GRUBER
   Email:  not available
  Postal:  Northwestern University
           2001 Sheridan Road
           Evanston, IL 60208  USA

ABSTRACT:
 A bipartisan consensus favors public policy initiatives to
 expand health insurance coverage. This paper summarizes new
 Current Population Survey (CPS) data on health insurance
 coverage for the non-elderly and discusses the issues involved
 in subsidizing health insurance. We outline a tax credit option
 designed to diminish many health insurance market flaws. A
 simple model illustrates that the Administration's recent
 proposal for tax credits for nongroup insurance alone is
 equivalent to a general insurance tax credit (our preferred
 option) with a tax on employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). Thus,
 it runs the risk of doing harm - undermining the insurance that
 currently covers most nonelderly Americans.

______________________________

"Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
 Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2001 Current Population Survey"
      EBRI Issue Brief, No. 240, December 2001

      BY:  PAUL FRONSTIN
              Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=296989

 Contact:  PAUL FRONSTIN
   Email:  Mailto:fronstin@ebri.org
  Postal:  Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)
           Suite 600
           2121 K Street, NW
           Washington, DC 20037-1896  USA
   Phone:  202-775-6352
     Fax:  202-775-6312

Paper Requests:
 Contact Alicia Willis at Mailto:publications@ebri.org, or 2121 K
 St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20037-1896.
 Phone:(202)572-7422, Fax:(202)775-6312. Full-Text downloads are
 available from SSRN Online for $7.50.

ABSTRACT:
 Between 1999 and 2000, the percentage of Americans with health
 insurance increased: 84.1 percent of nonelderly Americans were
 covered by some form of health insurance in 2000, up from 83.8
 percent in 1999. The percentage of nonelderly Americans without
 health insurance coverage declined from 16.2 percent in 1999 to
 15.9 percent in 2000, continuing a trend that started between
 1998 and 1999. The main reason for the decline in the number of
 uninsured Americans was the strong economy and low unemployment.
 Between 1999 and 2000, the percentage of nonelderly Americans
 covered by employment-based health insurance increased from 66.6
 percent to 67.3 percent, continuing a longer-term trend that
 started between 1993 and 1994. Even though the number and
 percentage of uninsured declined substantially between 1998 and
 2000, more than 38 million Americans remain uninsured. While an
 increasing percentage of Americans were being covered by
 employment-based health plans, this trend may not continue
 because of the combined re-emergence of health care cost
 inflation and the weak economy. As long as the economy is strong
 and unemployment is low, employment-based health insurance
 coverage will expand and the uninsured will decline gradually.
 However, the combination of the current weak economy and the
 rising cost of providing health benefits will likely result in
 more Americans without health insurance coverage. Should the
 uninsured remain unchanged and continue to represent 15.9
 percent of the nonelderly population, 40 million would be
 uninsured by 2005. If the uninsured represented 25 percent of
 the population, 63 million would be uninsured in 2005 and 65
 million nonelderly Americans would be uninsured by 2010.

 Keywords: Employment-based benefits, Health insurance
 coverage, Uninsured


JEL Classification: I1, J3
______________________________

"Financing Long-Term Care in the United States: Who Should Pay
 for Mom and Dad?"
      AGING: CARING FOR OUR ELDERS, David N. Weisstub, David C.
      Thomasma, Serge Gauthier & George F. Tomossy, eds., Kluwer
      Academic Publishers

      BY:  RICHARD L. KAPLAN
              University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College
              of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=294056

Paper ID:  Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 00-14

 Contact:  RICHARD L. KAPLAN
   Email:  Mailto:rkaplan@law.uiuc.edu
  Postal:  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College of Law
           504 East Pennsylvania Avenue
           Champaign, IL 61820  USA
   Phone:  (217) 333-2499
     Fax:  (217) 244-1478

Paper Requests:
 Contact Pat Estergard at Mailto:pesterga@law.uiuc.edu Postal:
 324 Law Building, MC 594, 504 E. Pennsylvania, Champaign, IL
 61820, Phone: 2l7-333-9853.

ABSTRACT:
 This article considers the legal framework that applies when
 older adults need long-term care in the United States. The
 financial aspects of this phenomenon hit almost all affected
 families as an unexpected crisis, because long-term care
 generally falls outside the purview of Medicare, the
 government's health care program for older Americans. After
 families discover this reality, they often look to Medicaid, the
 government's health care program for poor people of any age, but
 this program has severe problems of access to quality
 facilities, and its financial eligibility criteria preclude
 coverage of most elders. The article then analyzes some
 impediments to obtaining Medicaid coverage of long-term costs,
 including questions of legal capacity to undertake asset
 divestment, ineligibility penalties imposed on uncompensated
 transfers, and mandatory recovery from the estates of Medicaid
 recipients. The article then turns to private long-term care
 insurance as a possible response to this dilemma. The article
 considers recent tax changes that were intended to promote the
 purchase of this insurance, but finds that these benefits are
 often illusory and that regulation of such policies is still
 needed to facilitate informed comparison shopping. Finally, the
 article examines why the financing of long-term care costs
 should be a private responsibility at all, especially when the
 financing of acute care costs has been socialized via the
 Medicare program.

______________________________

"Retiree Health Benefits: Trends and Outlook"
      EBRI Issue Brief, No. 236, August 2001

      BY:  PAUL FRONSTIN
              Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=282590

 Contact:  PAUL FRONSTIN
   Email:  Mailto:fronstin@ebri.org
  Postal:  Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)
           Suite 600
           2121 K Street, NW
           Washington, DC 20037-1896  USA
   Phone:  202-775-6352
     Fax:  202-775-6312

Paper Requests:
 Contact Alicia Willis at Mailto:publications@ebri.org, or 2121 K
 St., NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20037-1896.
 Phone:(202)572-7422, Fax:(202)775-6312. Full-Text downloads are
 available from SSRN Online for $7.50.

ABSTRACT:
 Financial Accounting Statement No. 106 (FAS 106), approved by
 the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 1990, required most
 private companies to significantly alter the way they accounted
 for their retiree health benefits beginning with fiscal years
 after Dec. 15, 1992. FAS 106 dramatically impacts a company's
 calculation of its profits and losses and thereby creates a
 strong incentive for financial managers to limit expenses.

 As a result of FAS 106, and the increasing cost of providing
 retiree health benefits in general, many employers began a major
 overhaul of their retiree health benefit programs. Some
 employers placed caps on what they were willing to spend on
 retiree health benefits. Some added age and service
 requirements, while others moved to some type of "defined
 contribution" health benefit. Some completely dropped retiree
 health benefits for future retirees, while others dropped
 benefits for current retirees, although this happened less
 frequently than the other changes. Despite FAS 106, most
 55-64-year-olds are covered by some form of health insurance.
 However, since 1994, the percentage of persons ages 55-64
 without health insurance generally has been increasing.

 While the changes employers have made to retiree health
 benefits do not appear to be having much impact on current
 retirees, they are likely to be felt most by future retirees who
 are not yet or may never become eligible for retiree health
 benefits because the courts have ruled that an employer has a
 right to terminate or amend retiree health benefits only if it
 has proved that such a right has been reserved or stated in
 specific language and on a widely known basis.

 Another round of changes may take place in the near future,
 possibly further reducing or limiting the availability of
 retiree health benefits. Employers are likely to respond to the
 renewed surge in health benefit costs as well as recent court
 rulings regarding retiree health benefits and age discrimination
 and potential federal legislative initiatives that would make it
 more costly for employers to offer retiree health benefits. This
 paper documents these trends.

 Keywords: Employment-based benefits; FAS 106; Health care
 costs; Health care policy; Health insurance coverage; Retiree
 health benefits


JEL Classification: J32, M41, M44
______________________________

W O R K I N G   P A P E R   Abstracts
_________________________________________________________________

"Taxes and Health Insurance"

      BY:  JONATHAN GRUBER
              Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
              Department of Economics
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=294095

Paper ID:  NBER Working Paper No. W8657
    Date:  December 2001

 Contact:  JONATHAN GRUBER
   Email:  Mailto:gruberj@mit.edu
  Postal:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
           Department of Economics
           Room E52-355
           50 Memorial Drive
           Cambridge, MA 02142  USA
   Phone:  617-253-8892
     Fax:  617-253-1330

Paper Requests:
 Full-Text downloads are available from SSRN Online for $5.

ABSTRACT:
 A common prescription for reducing the number of uninsured is to
 increase the tax subsidization of health insurance in the U.S.
 Yet, we already provide over $100 billion per year in tax
 subsidies to health insurance. This paper provides an assessment
 of the past and potential impacts of taxation on health
 insurance coverage and costs. I begin by reviewing the central
 facts on health insurance and taxation. I then provide a
 framework for assessing the impacts of tax policies on health
 insurance coverage and costs, and I review the existing
 empirical evidence on the key behavioral parameters required to
 model these impacts. I conclude with the policy implications of
 these findings for tax policies to expand insurance coverage.


JEL Classification: H2, I1
______________________________

"Learning and the Value of Information: The Case of Health Plan
 Report Cards"

      BY:  MICHAEL CHERNEW
              University of Michigan
              Department of Economics
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
           GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN
              University of Minnesota
              Department of Economics
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
           DENNIS P. SCANLON
              Pennsylvania State University

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=290392

Paper ID:  NBER Working Paper No. W8589
    Date:  November 2001

 Contact:  GAUTAM GOWRISANKARAN
   Email:  Mailto:gautam@econ.umn.edu
  Postal:  University of Minnesota
           Department of Economics
           1035 Management and Economics
           271 19th Avenue South
           Minneapolis, MN 55455  USA
   Phone:  612-625-8310
     Fax:  612-624-0209
 Co-Auth:  MICHAEL CHERNEW
   Email:  Mailto:mchernew@umich.edu
  Postal:  University of Michigan
           Department of Economics
           611 Tappan Street
           Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220  USA
 Co-Auth:  DENNIS P. SCANLON
   Email:  Mailto:dpscanlon@psu.edu
  Postal:  Pennsylvania State University
           Department of Health Policy & Administration
           University Park, PA 16802  USA

Paper Requests:
 Full-Text downloads are available from SSRN Online for $5.

ABSTRACT:
 We estimate a Bayesian learning model in order to assess the
 value of health plan performance information and the extent to
 which the explicit provision of information about product
 quality alters consumer behavior. We take advantage of a natural
 experiment in which health plan performance information for HMOs
 was released to employees of a Fortune 50 company for the first
 time. Our empirical work indicates that the release of
 information affected health plan choices. Consumers were willing
 to pay an extra $276 per year per below average rating avoided,
 and the average value of the information per employee was $22
 per year. The priors on quality and the quality ratings have a
 correlation of 0.14 that is statistically significant. The
 results suggest that despite the existence of a variety of
 informal mechanisms to convey information, including reputation,
 consumers may value formally constructed performance measures.