_________________________________________________________________

  E M P L O Y E E   B E N E F I T S ,   C O M P E N S A T I O N
                    &   P E N S I O N   L A W
                  Vol. 6,  No. 10: May 19, 2005
_________________________________________________________________

Publisher:     Employment, Labor, Compensation & Pension Law Journals
               a division of
               Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. (SSEP)
               and Social Science Research Network (SSRN)

Editor:        PAMELA PERUN
               Urban Institute
               Mailto:pamela@planetnow.com

Copyright:     SSEP, Inc. 2005. All rights reserved.

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                      Topic of This Issue:
                        Social Security
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T A B L E   of   C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________


NEW and FORTHCOMING ARTICLES

"The Social Security Early Entitlement Age in a Structural Model
 of Retirement and Wealth"
      Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, pp. 441-463,
      February, 2005
     ALAN L. GUSTMAN
        Dartmouth College
        Department of Economics
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
     THOMAS STEINMEIER
        Texas Tech University
        Department of Economics and Geography


"The Security of Social Security Benefits and the President's
 Proposal"
      The Elder Law Report, Vol. 16, No. 9, pp. 1-5, April 2005
     RICHARD L. KAPLAN
        University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
        College of Law

WORKING PAPERS

"Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform"
     MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
        Harvard University


"Options to Balance Social Security Funds Over the Next 75 Years"
     VIRGINIA P. RENO
        National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)
     JONI LAVERY
        National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)


"The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security:
 An Evaluation"
     ROBERT J. SHILLER
        Yale University
        Cowles Foundation
        ICF at Yale School of Management
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


"Social Security, the Government Budget and National Savings"
     PETER A. DIAMOND
        Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
        Department of Economics
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


"Changes in the Physiology of Aging During the Twentieth Century"
     ROBERT W. FOGEL
        University of Chicago
        Graduate School of Business
        National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


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EDITORIAL POLICIES
 To provide the broadest coverage of research in Employee
 Benefits, Compensation & Pension Law we do not referee working
 papers. We accept abstracts of working papers in Employee
 Benefits, Compensation & Pension Law whose topics suit the
 coverage of the journal and which are part of the worldwide
 scholarly discourse.


N E W   and   F O R T H C O M I N G   Articles
_________________________________________________________________

"The Social Security Early Entitlement Age in a Structural Model
 of Retirement and Wealth"
      Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 89, pp. 441-463,
      February, 2005

      BY:  ALAN L. GUSTMAN
              Dartmouth College
              Department of Economics
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
           THOMAS STEINMEIER
              Texas Tech University
              Department of Economics and Geography

 Contact:  ALAN L. GUSTMAN
   Email:  Mailto:Alan.L.Gustman@dartmouth.edu
  Postal:  Dartmouth College
           Department of Economics
           6106 Rockefeller Center
           Hanover, NH 03755  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  603-646-2641
     Fax:  603-646-2122
 Co-Auth:  THOMAS STEINMEIER
   Email:  Mailto:thomas.steinmeier@ttu.edu
  Postal:  Texas Tech University
           Department of Economics and Geography
           Lubbock, TX 79409-2101  UNITED STATES

ABSTRACT:
 A structural life cycle model of retirement and wealth
 attributes retirement peaks at both ages 62 and 65 to Social
 Security rules and wide heterogeneity in time preferences. Those
 with high discount rates often retire at 62. They have few
 assets and heavily value lost benefits from working after 62,
 largely ignoring potential increases in later benefits.
 Declining actuarial adjustments beginning at 65 induce those
 with low discount rates to retire at 65. Raising the Social
 Security early entitlement age to 64 induces 5 percent of the
 population to delay retiring, shifting the retirement spike from
 62 to 64.


JEL Classification: H55, J14, J26, J32, D31, E21, D91, I3
______________________________

"The Security of Social Security Benefits and the President's
 Proposal"
      The Elder Law Report, Vol. 16, No. 9, pp. 1-5, April 2005

      BY:  RICHARD L. KAPLAN
              University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
              College of Law

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=700323

Paper ID:  U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE05-007

 Contact:  RICHARD L. KAPLAN
   Email:  Mailto:RKAPLAN@LAW.UIUC.EDU
  Postal:  University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
           College of Law
           504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
           Champaign, IL 61820  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  (217) 333-2499
     Fax:  (217) 244-1478

ABSTRACT:
 This article considers the Social Security program and President
 George W. Bush's proposal for individual accounts. The article
 begins by addressing the nature of the Social Security program's
 trust fund and explains how the federal government's ability to
 pay benefits is a function of political will more than the
 pecuniary intricacies of governmental trust fund accounting. The
 article then critically examines the components of the long-term
 financial situation of Social Security, including the use of
 economic growth rate assumption's that are extremely low by
 historical standards. It then analyzes several different
 possible responses, including reallocating governmental
 expenditures, changing the formula for calculating initial
 retirement benefits, increasing the cap on Social Security's
 payroll tax, and raising the retirement age, among others.
 Finally, the article notes that folks who would prefer to depend
 on their own individually managed retirement assets have a
 mechanism already available in the form of the Individual
 Retirement Account, a mechanism that is superior to President
 Bush's proposal for individual Social Security accounts in
 several dimensions.

______________________________

W O R K I N G   P A P E R   Abstracts
_________________________________________________________________

"Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform"

      BY:  MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
              Harvard University

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=656581

Paper ID:  NBER Working Paper No. W11084
    Date:  January 2005

 Contact:  MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN
   Email:  Mailto:msfeldst@nber.org
  Postal:  National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
           1050 Massachusetts Avenue
           Cambridge, MA 02138  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  617-868-3905
     Fax:  617-868-7194

ABSTRACT:
 This paper describes the risks implied by a mixed system of
 Social Security pension benefits with different combinations of
 pay-as-you-go taxes and personal retirement account (PRA)
 saving. The analysis shows how these risks can be reduced by
 using alternative private market guarantee strategies. The first
 such strategy uses a blend of equities and TIPS to guarantee at
 least a positive real rate or return on each year's PRA saving.
 The second is an explicit zero-cost collar that guarantees an
 annual rate of return by giving up all returns above a certain
 level. One variant of these guarantees uses a two stage
 procedure: a guaranteed return to age 66 and then a separate
 guarantee on the implicit return in the annuity phase. An
 alternative strategy provides a combined guarantee on the return
 during both the accumulation and the annuity phase. Simulations
 are presented of the probability distributions of retirement
 incomes relative to the 'benchmark' benefits specified in
 current law. Calculations of expected utility show that these
 risk reduction techniques can raise expected utility relative to
 the plans with no guarantees. The ability to do so depends on
 the individual's risk aversion level. This underlines the idea
 that different individuals would rationally prefer different
 investment strategies and risk reduction options.


JEL Classification: H0, H3, H5
______________________________

"Options to Balance Social Security Funds Over the Next 75 Years"

      BY:  VIRGINIA P. RENO
              National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)
           JONI LAVERY
              National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=678549

    Date:  February 2005

 Contact:  VIRGINIA P. RENO
   Email:  Mailto:vreno@nasi.org
  Postal:  National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)
           1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
           Suite 615
           Washington, DC 20036-1904  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  202-452-8097
     Fax:  202-452-8111
 Co-Auth:  JONI LAVERY
   Email:  Mailto:jlavery@nasi.org
  Postal:  National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)
           1776 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
           Suite 615
           Washington, DC 20036-1904  UNITED STATES

ABSTRACT:
 Social Security is in excellent financial shape over the next
 decade; it is running surpluses while the rest of the federal
 government is running deficits. If the Trustees' "best
 estimates" for the next 75 years hold true, Social Security
 funds will fall short of benefit costs in about 2042. In that
 year, taxes coming in will be sufficient to pay 73 percent of
 benefits promised under current law. Many options are possible
 to ensure that all legislated benefits can be paid. This brief
 explores a variety of changes that eliminate all or part of the
 shortfall. Removing the cap on wages subject to Social Security
 taxes - now $90,000 - would bring in enough new money to
 eliminate the deficit. Price-indexing the benefit formula would
 reduce benefits enough to erase the deficit. Many combinations
 of changes would remedy the projected shortfall for 75 years and
 beyond. The brief also notes how proposals to create individual
 Social Security accounts differ from plans to bring about
 long-term solvency.

______________________________

"The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security:
 An Evaluation"

      BY:  ROBERT J. SHILLER
              Yale University
              Cowles Foundation
              ICF at Yale School of Management
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=703221

Paper ID:  Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-06; Cowles Foundation
           Discussion Paper No. 1504
    Date:  April 2005

 Contact:  ROBERT J. SHILLER
   Email:  Mailto:robert.shiller@yale.edu
  Postal:  Yale University
           Cowles Foundation
           Box 208281
           New Haven, CT 06520-8281  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  203-432-3708
     Fax:  203-432-6167

ABSTRACT:
 The life-cycle accounts proposal for Social Security reform has
 been justified by its proponents using a number of different
 arguments, but these arguments generally involve the assumption
 of a high likelihood of good returns on the accounts. A
 simulation is undertaken to estimate the probability
 distribution of returns in the accounts based on long-term
 historical experience. U.S. stock market, bond market and money
 market data 1871-2004 are used for the analysis. Assuming that
 future returns behave like historical data, it is found that a
 baseline personal account portfolio after offset will be
 negative 32% of the time on the retirement date. The median
 internal rate of return in this case is 3.4 percent, just above
 the amount necessary for holders of the accounts to break even.
 However, the U.S. stock market has been unusually successful
 historically by world standards. It would be better if we adjust
 the historical data to reduce the assumed average stock market
 return for the simulation. When this is done so that the return
 matches the median stock market return of 15 countries 1900-2000
 as reported by Dimson et al. [2002], the baseline personal
 account is found to be negative 71% of the time on the date of
 retirement and the median internal rate of return is 2.6
 percent.


JEL Classification: H55
______________________________

"Social Security, the Government Budget and National Savings"

      BY:  PETER A. DIAMOND
              Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
              Department of Economics
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=700383

Paper ID:  MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 05-09
    Date:  March 17, 2005

 Contact:  PETER A. DIAMOND
   Email:  Mailto:pdiamond@mit.edu
  Postal:  Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
           Department of Economics
           Room E52-344
           50 Memorial Drive
           Cambridge, MA 02142  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  617-253-3363
     Fax:  617-253-7804

ABSTRACT:
 The overlapping generations model pioneered by Paul Samuelson is
 used to address an issue in Social Security. In the 1983 Social
 Security reform, Congress chose to build a substantial trust
 fund, with principal and interest both to be used for later
 benefits. That is, Congress chose payroll tax rates higher than
 pay-as-you-go levels while the baby-boomers were in the labor
 force in order to have payroll tax rates lower than
 pay-as-you-go while the baby-boomers were retired. The impact on
 national capital of these higher payroll taxes, with the implied
 trust fund buildup, has been controversial. The impact depends
 on the response of the rest of the government budget as well as
 the responses of individuals to these government actions. It
 also depends on the effects of future tax changes as well as
 initial tax changes. This paper explores a simple model
 distinguishing two types in each cohort - life-cycle savers and
 nonsavers, and allowing an income tax change to offset a
 fraction of the additional revenue from any payroll tax change.
 Analyzing a permanent trust fund increase, even if the unified
 budget is always balanced, the trust fund buildup increases
 national capital initially when payroll taxpayers have a lower
 propensity to save out of payroll taxes than income taxpayers do
 out of the income tax, as is plausible. The long run impact on
 capital depends on the fraction of the payroll tax revenue
 increase that is offset by an income tax decrease.


JEL Classification: H55, H20
______________________________

"Changes in the Physiology of Aging During the Twentieth Century"

      BY:  ROBERT W. FOGEL
              University of Chicago
              Graduate School of Business
              National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Document:  Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
           http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=693094

Paper ID:  NBER Working Paper No. W11233
    Date:  March 2005

 Contact:  ROBERT W. FOGEL
   Email:  Mailto:rwf@cpe.uchicago.edu
  Postal:  University of Chicago
           Graduate School of Business
           Center for Population Economics
           5807 South Woodlawn Av.
           Chicago, IL 60637  UNITED STATES
   Phone:  773-702-7709
     Fax:  773-702-2901

ABSTRACT:
 One way to demonstrate how remarkable changes in the process of
 aging have been is to compare health over the life cycles of 3
 cohorts. For the first cohort, born between 1835 and 1845 (the
 Civil War cohort), life was short and disabilities were common
 even at young ages. Other factors contributing to lifelong poor
 health were widespread exposure to severely debilitating
 diseases and chronic malnutrition. Fewer of the World War II
 cohort, born between 1920 and 1930, died in infancy and most of
 the survivors have lived past age 60 without developing severe
 chronic diseases. Members of this cohort have experienced better
 health throughout their lives largely due to their lower
 exposure to environmental hazards before birth and throughout
 their infancy and early childhood. Members of the cohort born
 between 1980 and 1990 have a 50-50 chance of living to age 100.
 The average age at onset of disabilities has continued to rise,
 so members of this cohort can expect to remain healthy at later
 ages. Adopting a healthy life style early can help to prevent or
 postpone disability at older ages.